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"There is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management."

Robert S. McNamara

In the past, presidents As recent crises?both potentially nuclear and
have tended to deal with
nonnuclear?suggest, a more self-conscious, for
a crisis in an ad hoc,
mal mechanism for crisis management is necessary
"I'll cross that bridgeat the executive level.

when I come to it"

manner. In a nuclear
Foreign policy crises are recurring and exceed
age, the US can no ingly dangerous. A considerable amount of re
longer afford such a search has been done in a variety of academic
luxury. As recent crises

disciplines which attempts to understand the na

suggest, a more self
ture of crisis, the pressures decision-makers face
conscious, formal
mechanism for crisis in a crisis, and what might be done to improve

management is

conflict resolution and crisis management skills.
This paper attempts to focus that research on the
American presidency.1 What pressures are a pres
ident and his top advisers likely to face during a
system for the executive
crisis? What potential hazards must be avoided?
branch consisting of five
components: (1) precrisis How can leaders diffuse tension or better manage
training seminars;
crises? While crisis management is not a panacea,

necessary.
This paper* presents a
crisis management

(2) crisis control centers;
(3) crisis communication;

(4) crisis norms and
procedures; and (5)
institutionalizing a
devil's advocate.

there are a variety of skills which can be brought

to bear on a crisis which are designed to reduce

the likelihood that crises will lead to open warfare.
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Dealing with Crises

Crisis management has become a frequent style of interaction in world
politics. The average number of crises has risen in this century compared
with the last century,2 the frequency of crises confrontation rising more

than fourfold between 1960 and 1976.3 Between 1946 and 1976, an

average of 18.2 military conflicts were under way each year.4 Several of
these conflicts threatened to engage the nuclear powers in a direct con

frontation. Ip a way, the post-World War II period could be called an

"age of crisis.55
Do crises necessarily escalate into war? Since the First World War, 83
percent of all crises involved the use of force.5 But, although the proportion

of crises which lead to the use of force among the major powers has

actually declined in this period,6 the consequences of escalation to violence
in a crisis involving nuclear armed superpowers have grown even more
ominous. Particularly during the present period of transition in the in
ternational system, crisis can be expected to be an endemic feature of
international life. This being the case, we must become more conscious
of conflict resolution and crisis management techniques.
A crisis is an event which occurs suddenly and heightens tensions. It
appears where stakes are high, where there is little time to decide and act,
and where decision-makers are under intense pressure. The atmosphere
is one of uncertainty and contains expectations of hostile action.7
In a crisis, tradition calls for the president to step to the forefront and
assume command. As the principal actor in the foreign policy process, the
president, during a crisis, is granted and assumes wide prerogative powers.8
Rossiter criticized the separation of powers for its "crisis inefficiencies55
and suggested that in a crisis we turn to the president as the "constitutional
dictator.559 Whatever label one cares to place upon the crisis president, it
is clear that during crises, the public, courts, and Congress generally look
to the chief executive to assume control. As Klieman writes: "In an emer

gency, with the nation's fate possibly at stake, power will flow to the
president. National peril creates the political and psychological conditions
for the use of power by a determined, confident president. Emergencies
evoke a psychological need for authority. They also present a need within
government for centralized leadership and decisive action.5510

Nuclear versus Nonnuclear Crises
All crises are threatening, but a crisis with the potential use of nuclear

weapons introduces threats of such a proportion as to produce unima
ginable strain upon decision-makers. There is a fundamental difference
between a nonnuclear crisis, such as the Iranian hostage situation, and a
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potentially nuclear crisis, such as the Cuban missile crisis. A nonnuclear
crisis threatens the national interest, whereas a nuclear crisis threatens the
survival of the system itself.

With the advent of nuclear weapons, crisis management has been raised
to a new level.11 In effect, the possession of nuclear weapons has made
war between the superpowers unacceptable as an option. Thus, states are
limited in their menu of possible responses when confronting an adversary

who possesses nuclear weapons. As Richard Ned Lebow writes: "The
prevailing wisdom is that war as an outcome of crisis between nuclear

powers has become so disastrous as to be unacceptable. Concern for

winning confrontations obviously remains and crisis bargaining still entails
implicit or even explicit threats of war. However, nuclear adversaries must
be extremely wary of losing control over events or of otherwise becoming

irrevocably committed to war. Crisis bargaining, so the argument goes,

has become more difficult because of the unclear boundaries between
'winning5 and 'disaster avoidance.5 Statesmen must walk a fine line between

risking war in order to demonstrate resolve and actually pushing the
confrontation to the point where war becomes likely. The need for caution

makes it more difficult to impart credibility to any threat to go to war
because the adversary knows the inherent irrationality of such threats.55
Lebow adds: "It follows from this paradoxical dynamic that a crisis be
tween nuclear powers is, in the words of Thomas Schelling, an exercise
in 'competitive risk-taking.5 Schelling suggests that in practice the thresh

old of war is likely to be ambiguous. The side that Svins5 is most often
the side that escalated to the point where a matching escalation is perceived
by the leaders of the other side to entail greater risks of war than they are

willing to assume. Put crudely, success hinges upon making an adversary
believe that he is forced to choose between concession or war.5512

Crisis Management Defined

Hilliard Roderick suggests that "Crisis Management consists of con

tingency planning prior to a crisis and the active management of a crisis
once it occurs.5513 This definition contains the two primary components
of crisis management: precrisis planning, and during-crisis steerage. While
most definitions of crisis management concentrate exclusively on during
crisis steerage, it is also important to include those steps which can be
taken prior to the outbreak of a crisis, which can better equip a leader to
deal with the demands he or she is likely to face during the active man
agement of a crisis.
Phil Williams adds another component to our definition of crisis man
agement when he writes that: "Crisis management is concerned on the
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one hand with the procedures for controlling and regulating a crisis so
that it does not get out of hand and lead to war, and on the other hand
with ensuring that the crisis is resolved on a satisfactory basis in which
the vital interests of the state are secured and protected. The second aspect

will almost invariably necessitate vigorous actions carrying substantial
risks. One task of crisis management, therefore, is to temper these risks,
to keep them as low and as controllable as possible, while the other is to
ensure that the coercive diplomacy and risk-taking tactics are as effective
as possible in gaining concessions from the adversary and maintaining
one's own position relatively intact."14
Williams's concern for a satisfactory resolution of the crisis (short of
war or surrender) becomes the third component of crisis management.
The question then becomes, how does one prepare leaders before a crisis
to meet the demands of crisis steerage better so as to increase the chances
that the crisis will be resolved short of war or surrender?
This paper will concentrate on precrisis planning in an effort to develop
a better crisis management capacity in the executive branch.

At present, there is no formal, deliberate at
tempt to give the president precrisis training.

The projected While the National Security Council (NSC) has
development of a Crisis Management Center, the efforts to bring
space weapons

will have
far-reaching

implications for

space and

security.

top officials of the administration into a more
formalized training program are quite limited.
The lack of explicit precrisis training seems sur
prising in light of the importance of crisis deci
sion-making in a nuclear age. After all, given the
wrong move, leaders may not get a second chance
to correct their mistakes. And yet, most nations
seem willing to continue to run the risk of having
leaders face the pressures of crisis decision-making

with woefully little preparation.
Alexander George described the reaction of a senior member of the
NSC in the Carter administration to its first crisis. He said that "the most
staggering thing was walking into the White House during our first major
crisis, wondering what to do, and then all of a sudden realizing that there
are no rales, no books, and no procedures. One of your first thoughts is
to ask the President; but the President doesn't know; he only knows what
the staff tells him."15

The need for a more self-conscious pre-crisis training vehicle was re
cently addressed by William Ury when he wrote: "One way to think about
this question is to imagine yourself in the shoes of the president of the
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United States on the day a new Middle East war broke out or when a
nuclear missile was launched by accident. What might you wish you had
talked about beforehand with your Soviet counterpart? What agreements

to halt escalation would you wish you had reached? What procedures

would you want to have in place to ensure you were able either to defuse
the crisis or, better yet, prevent it in the first place? These steps must be
taken ahead of time because once a crisis erupts it may be too late to create

new procedures.5516
A functional precrisis training apparatus must therefore anticipate (by
reviewing past crises) the problems a leader is likely to face in any crisis
(generic dysfunctionalism) and better prepare decision-makers to face such

challenges in the future. A word of caution is in order here. All precrisis
training can do is attempt to make the process "better55 and increase the
likelihood that decision-makers will make wiser decisions in a crisis. Such
training attempts to introduce more rationality into an atmosphere which
often promotes irrationality. It seeks to give leaders slighdy more control
in a situation which often seems out of control. It attempts to highlight
for the leader, those aspects of crisis decision-making most prone to pitfalls,
and give the leader a more self-conscious approach. And hopefully, by
having a more deliberate precrisis apparatus for the president, the insti
tutional memory of the executive branch can help a leader learn from past
crisis experiences.

Dysfunctional Aspects of Crisis17
Among the many pressures a president is likely to face in a crisis are the
following: shortness of time to decide and act; seriousness of consequences
(high stakes); incomplete, incorrect or skewed information; psychological
prejudices (e.g., misperception, fear, hatred, etc.); complexity; an atmos
phere of uncertainty; poor communication with the adversary; stress or
fatigue; bureaucratic-organizational resistance; limited options; and cog

nitive biases.

As Ury and Smoke point out, "These factors press decision-makers to
take hasty, often escalatory, action to protect vital interests. Through
action and reaction, miscalculation and miscommunication, a runaway
crisis and war may result.5518

A. Time
While a crisis may require a speedy response, the danger of a decision
being made on faulty, incomplete or incorrect information is enormous.
When the decision-maker feels there is no time to check on information,
the leader may rush to judgment on the assumption that action is better
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than inaction. If nothing else, doing something ? anything ? restores
some sense of control over events. Was that bleep on the computer a sign

of Soviet attack? If so, how much time do I have to respond? Eleven

minutes? Six minutes? If I don't decide now, will it be too late?
Because the dangers of a rash decision are so great for all involved, both
sides have a stake in controlling the pace of crisis. If there can be a pause,
a slowing down of events, then both sides will have an opportunity to
verify information, exchange messages, explore alternatives, and develop
options short of war. Almost by definition, if one can slow the pace of
crisis it ceases to be a crisis. This is one of the premier goals of crisis

management.

B. High Stakes
By its very nature, a crisis implies high stakes and serious consequences
for a wrong move. Since a "perceived vital national interest55 is involved,
leaders may risk a great deal to protect that which they feel is central to
their state5s future.
Since leaders are often willing to go to the brink to protect vital national

interests, it is important for them to understand clearly which interests
are vital, and which are secondary. For example, would the Soviet Union
risk a nuclear war to come to the aid of the Marxist leaders of a small and
politically insignificant island a few hundred miles from the coast of the

US? Probably not. However, they probably would be more inclined to
stand up?militarily if necessary?to a threat to their control of Poland

which they feel is a vital buffer zone.
Likewise, the United States can do little in a direct way to aid Afghan
rebels. Afghanistan is generally seen as not vital to the US national interest,

and it would be foolish to risk nuclear war over Soviet intervention into
that country. If, however, Marxist rebels began to make significant inroads

in Mexico, the United States would be more inclined to intervene
militarily.
C. Information

Sound, rational decision-making requires good information, properly
presented, clearly understood. As important as good information is, there
is probably nothing more difficult for a decision-maker than finding un
ambiguous and reliable information or getting a wide range of options
from which to choose a course of action. There is nothing diabolical in
this. Good information is a precious commodity, and even the president,

who sits atop what, on the surface, appears to be the world's most so
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phisticated information-gathering apparatus, has difficulty getting infor
mation in which he can place confidence.
The information problem is exaggerated in a crisis. When time is short,
it is even more difficult to check up on the reliability of information. But

in a crisis, reliable information is vital. While a decision-maker may get
a sufficient quantity of data or even information overload, quality of
information is the problem.
How can the decision-maker insure access to the necessary information?
There is no foolproof system, but a leader who is aware of the potential
pitfalls can gain a fighting chance in the search for good information.
In a crisis, traditional patterns of interaction break down, and the pres
ident is, in a sense, free of the bureaucratic-institutional restraints under
which he must usually operate. The president is potentially free to set up
the information processing system with which he feels most comfortable.

There is no ironclad "best" system. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis,
President Kennedy formed what was called the Executive Committee of
the NSC (ExCom). This was a collection of trusted advisors and military
personnel who Kennedy believed would give him a broad range of advice,
and in whose judgments he generally trusted.19

Kennedy's decision to form ExCom, an ad hoc body of advisers, re
flected his determination to get a broad range of advice, plus his recog
nition that the missile crisis required a different apparatus to gather and
process information. This was not politics as usual, and, given the vast
array of problems and level of uncertainty, Kennedy decided to go beyond
the normal advisory process and set up a special unit. This allowed him
to demand that the advice and information he received was the best
possible, given the limitations of the situation. He constandy challenged
the validity of the information given him, he repeatedly questioned the
assumptions upon which advice was based, and he insisted that a wide
range of alternatives be explored before a consensus was reached.

This process did not?could not?guarantee a good decision, but it

did improve the chances that a rational decision could be reached. This
process sought to check and recheck information, question and requestion
assumptions, explore and reexplore alternatives, and walk and rewalk in
the adversary's shoes.
While the ExCom style fit Kennedy, not all leaders may feel comfortable
with such a process. Currendy, the National Security Council has a Crisis
Management Center which attempts to ready the administration for any
possible crisis that may emerge. It gathers and analyzes data about potential

crisis areas, serves as a clearinghouse for crisis management information,
and is the "institutional memory" of the executive branch from which
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decision-makers can draw information about past crises in an attempt to
bring experience to bear on the current crisis. Two additional units assist
the NSC in crisis management: the Special Situation Group (SSG), chaired
by the vice president, and the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG), chaired
by the deputy assistant to the president for National Security Affairs.20
Whatever apparatus a president employs, there are a variety of potential

malfunctions in the advisory system which must be avoided. Decision
makers must be carefiil not to accept information, advice or assumptions
too readily. Critical thinking in a crisis is essential. This is especially true
where information is concerned. Presidents need to be suspicious when
agreement comes too easily; avoid yes men who will too easily agree with
the leader; be sure that all options are carefully reviewed; avoid isolation;
be sure that a "devil's advocate"21 is present (and listened to) who will
challenge, question, and present unpopular ideas; avoid "group think";22
and prevent the personality of the decision-maker23 from adversely af
fecting the way information-advice is processed.
D. Psychological Prejudice and Cognitive Biases

Perception, or misperception,24 plays an enormous role in decision
making. Given that both US and Soviet leaders have developed rather
myopic, devil images of their adversaries,25 it is imperative that prejudices

or cognitive rigidity do not dictate policy in a crisis. This is not to say
that both sides enter into the process with a clean slate as regards their
evaluations of the adversary. Past interactions, historic relations, patterns
of behavior are all relevant in evaluating the likely response of an adversary,

but it is too easy to slip into the trap of dehumanizing an adversary.
Rational decision-making in a crisis requires resisting this temptation.

Misperception means that there is a discrepancy between image and

reality. The further removed from reality, the more cognitive processing
differs from the real world. There are a number of forms of misperception
which could interfere with sound decision-making: overconfidence of a
personal (e.g., excessively virile-macho self-image) or military (e.g., belief
that a military solution is preferable over a diplomatic one) nature; dia
bolical image of the enemy (e.g., the view that there is a good guy-bad
guy, devil-angel conflict);26 information problems (e.g., incomplete or
inaccurate information); institutional forms of misperception (e.g., "group

think"); denial (the tendency to block out unpleasant circumstances);
dehumanization (the viewing of others as subhuman or without human
qualities); projection (attributing our more undesirable traits and char
acteristics to the adversary); and overpersonalization (as Kennedy said of
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Khrushchev at the outset of the Cuban missile crisis, "How could he do
this to me?55).

Can we create a crisis control system which forestalls all human error
or folly? A structure that avoids misperception, miscommunication, panic
or stupidity? Of course, there is no foolproof system, but ways can be
found ? institutional and individual ? to reduce the dangers of misper
ception, misinformation, miscommunication, and rash action. To help
achieve these goals, it is essential to slow down the pace of events, explore
all options and how they will be viewed by the adversary, open lines of
communication between adversaries, and give each side a chance to save

face.

Additionally, to disengage emotions, a nonthreatening posture is es
sential. If one side issues a public ultimatum, offering only war or sur
render, it forces the adversary into a position where it may be impossible

to back away from the conflict. If one wishes to avoid war, the crisis must
be viewed as a non-zero-sum game. When one or both sides see the conflict
in zero-sum terms, where what one side wins, the other loses, the likeli
hood of war increases significantly. Crisis management must be conscious
of supplying nonescalatory, nonthreatening options for both sides.

E. Complexity, Uncertainty, and Communication
Even under the best circumstances, problem solving is difficult and
confusing. In a crisis, problems are compounded. Because of the added
complexity and uncertainty involved in crisis decision-making, it is all the

more important for leaders to identify clearly the specific nature of the
perceived threat and its relationship to the national interest.

Once the nature of the threatened interests is made clear, and it is
determined to what extent vital national interests are in jeopardy, the
information process becomes the focal point. In an effort to reduce com
plexity to manageable proportions, good information is essential.
Additionally, communication27 with the adversary is necessary. Be it
through direct leader-to-leader contact (via an improved Hot Line), dip
lomatic exchange, or informal contacts, both sides must keep talking. Only

in this way can each side express its views in a clear and, it is hoped,
nonthreatening manner. Only in this way can measures be devised which
allow each side to move slowly away from crisis thinking and crisis be
havior. The irony, however, is that, in a crisis, the temptation is to cut
off communication, to stop talking.

F. Stress and Fatigue
In a crisis, decision-makers are put under an extraordinary amount of
pressure. The stress and fatigue which result from seemingly endless hours
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or days of high pressure situations will take a toll on leaders. The question
is: What impact will this have on leaders?28
In these high pressure situations the decision-maker may be more vul
nerable to error. Stress can impair the decision-maker's judgment. The
cumulative effect of both physical and emotional stress over a prolonged
period of time can be devastating. As Robert F. Kennedy notes about the
Cuban missile crisis, ccThat kind of pressure does strange things to a human
being, even to brilliant, self-confident, mature, experienced men. For some
it brings out characteristics and strengths that perhaps even they never
knew they had, and for others the pressure is too overwhelming."29 Ted
Sorensen, another participant in the Cuban missile crisis, saw "during the
long days and nights of the Cuban crisis, how brutally physical and mental
fatigue can numb the good sense as well as the senses of normally articulate

men."30

G. Bureaucratic Resistance
As mentioned previously, in a crisis the traditional institutional and
bureaucratic controls on a leader begin to fade, and individual or small
group control emerges. However, this does not mean that the bureaucratic
apparatus of government can be ignored. To the extent that bureaucratic
organizations are involved in the process, they are likely to exhibit par
ochial perspectives, routine behavior, and bureaucratic inertia, and may
thus retard the crisis decision and action process. And, once decisions are
made, implementation is turned over to the bureaucracy. Therefore, if one
is to ensure that the directives of the leadership are fully and accurately
carried out, attention must be paid to how the permanent government
receives and processes presidential decisions.
There is a tendency, once a crisis decision is made, to relax, to act as
if the real work had been done. But such a temptation must be avoided.
If decisions are not properly implemented, then all the good ideas and
calculated moves may be undone by poor execution.
With these and many other problems multiplying and intensifying dur
ing a crisis, it is a wonder that a greater percentage of crises do not end
in war. Crisis presents the leader with a greater need than ever to act
rationally, and yet a crisis puts multiple pressures on the leader, which

makes the always elusive goal of rational decision-making even more
difficult.

Given that, even in the most calm and secure of circumstances, achieving
complete rationality is difficult, is there a way during a crisis to promote
the limited goal of greater rationality?
Crises are not entirely idiosyncratic. There are general patterns which
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become the basis for prescriptive analysis. If the techniques of better crisis

management are to be conveyed to top decision-makers, ways must be
found to tailor the generalized knowledge of crisis decision-making to
meet the particular needs of each crisis. Moreover, ways must be found
to inform leaders as to what problems they are most likely to face during
a crisis, and how they might better overcome these potential pitfalls.
Richard Ned Lebow faces this when he writes: "The only way to combat
the incredible pressures likely to confront national leaders facing the pos
sibility of nuclear holocaust is to provide them with the preparation and
training to overcome their human frailties. ... In a nuclear crisis, a leader's

ability to cope successfully is likely to be increased by his willingness to
adapt his policies to changing circumstances. Also, a leader's decisions can
be improved immeasurably by solid grounding in the technical issues likely

to be confronted. Presidents who have not previously studied crisis man
agement or who have not gone through crisis drills are likely to be in
sufficiendy aware of the danger of loss of control associated with high
alert levels. They are also likely to become captive to prepackaged options
that bear little resemblance to their political needs at the time."31

Developing a Crisis Management System

Can decision-makers be trained to deal with crises more effectively? At
present, there is little or no preparation to help leaders deal with crisis
management. But there are steps which can be taken and which can in
crease the likelihood that, during a crisis, leaders will deal with the problem

in a more rational manner. On the surface, such a qualified endorsement
may appear to be a rather small step, but in a crisis, disasters are often
made of small mistakes.

A more self-conscious, institutionalized precrisis approach needs to be
developed which will better prepare an incoming president and top mil
itary and civilian officials to face the varied demands of crisis management.

Such a crisis management program should include (at a minimum) the

following:

A. Crisis Training Seminars
One of the most important steps which could be taken to improve the
crisis management capability of the executive branch would be to institute
a series of crisis training seminars for the president and other top admin

istrative officials.32 Such seminars could be held before a new president
takes office (during the preinaugural period) and also, periodically, during

his tenure.
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The precrisis briefing should have a fairly specific set of objectives. As
Ury and Smoke suggest, it should include the following:
(1) Understanding the range of possible nuclear crises scenarios, with
some emphasis on crisis scenarios other than the "bolt from the blue55 and

Central European scenarios.
(2) A review of past crises and their lessons (for instance, the Cuban
missile crisis).
(3) Understanding the current American crisis management system and
crisis decision-making process, including its weaknesses and fragilities.
(4) Understanding the Soviet crisis management system and style, in
cluding its weaknesses and fragilities.
(5) Understanding joint Soviet-American institutional arrangements,
such as the Hot Line, Accidents Agreement, etc.
(6) Appreciating the range of possible strategies for negotiating with
the USSR in times of crisis.

(7) A previous opportunity to practice a decision sequence, to experi
ment, and to make mistakes.
(8) Experiencing, at least in part, the sensations, stress, time constric
tion, and emotions of a nuclear crisis (so that leaders will not be wholly
unfamiliar with them in the actual event.)33
Ury and Smoke also suggest: "The briefing would not emphasize po
litical and military decisions more than details of military capabilities or
hardware (on which the president-elect would be officially briefed after
inauguration). It would focus more on how a president should think about
problems in managing crises and reaching decisions than on the technical
details of airborne command posts or 'pre-programmed nuclear options.5
Finally, it would attempt to communicate the accumulated body of prec
edents, amounting in a sense to unwritten 'understandings5 about how the
two superpowers will behave in crisis. It is not clear that this accumulated

learning is fully passed on through changes of administration in
Washington.5534

In addition to giving the new administration the benefit of insights by
past participants, the seminar's briefings should also include films dealing

with past crises (e.g., Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis); simulation
exercises (in an effort to give the leaders some sense of the actual situational

demands of a crisis); case study reviews (to show how crises started, how
they were dealt with, etc.); crisis planning (charting out, in advance, the
kinds of crises that might arise, and anticipating how such crises might
be dealt with organizationally; and other shoes exercises (having top of
ficials assume the roles of the Soviets in an effort to sensitize them to the
demands and behavior patterns of a potential adversary).
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B. Crises Control Centers

Presently under review in both Moscow and Washington is the pro
posal, championed by the late Senator Henry Jackson and recendy pro
moted by Senators Nunn and Warner, to establish crisis control and risk
reduction centers.
Such centers,35 to be located either in one neutral site, or two centers,
one in the US and one in the Soviet Union, would be staffed by military
and diplomatic personnel. Their primary mission would be to monitor
possible crisis situations. But they could do much more.
The centers could be active with both precrisis management and during
crisis activities. Prior to a crisis, these centers could exchange information,

clarify activities (e.g., troop movements), exchange technical information
and problem solving, conduct high level discussions, maintain expertise,
train officials in crisis management, and head off potential crisis situations.

During a crisis, these centers could help carry out emergency safety pro
cedures, verify information, exchange messages, keep lines of communi

cation open, etc.

If such centers were taken seriously by both sides, and became the hub
of an ongoing exchange process, they could prove invaluable in allowing
each nation to stem the tide of crises, especially those involving accidents
and third party confrontations. The potential for such centers to broaden
their activities (e.g., to deal with terrorism) must also be considered.

C. Crisis Communication
During a crisis, the need for direct communication is strongest. Yet, it
is in just such times that the tendency not to communicate is most pro
nounced. This being the case, conscious efforts must be made to deal with
communication shutdowns before a crisis makes such steps unlikely.
In addition to the establishment of crisis control centers, several steps
can be taken to improve communication between the superpowers. An
improved Hot Line that takes advantage of state of the art technology
could connect the White House to the Kremlin, and crisis control center
to crisis control center. The Hot Line (or Direct Communications Link,
DCL) would add to its satellite communications circuits a facsimile trans
mission capability, as well as a voice and video capability.
An additional way to supplement communication between the super

powers would be to regularize summit meetings. This should not be

restricted to just the heads of state, but should also include establishing
regular summits with Cabinet and ministerial level officials of the US and

the Soviet Union.
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D. Establishing Crisis Procedures
Is it possible to establish norms or procedures to be followed in the
event of a crisis? Can rules of the game be developed? Such a notion has
generated a great deal of interest in the last several years.36 Explicit, agreed

upon ground rules for crisis behavior which clarified expected actions,
defined boundaries beyond which adversaries should not tread, and a set
of understood signals, might have the effect of making wars less likely.
Such rules are needed because the present system of communicating during
crisis is often ambiguous, and because the existing mechanism or rules are

too weak.

Coral Bell suggests the following as a basic set of precrisis guidelines
to be followed in a crisis:
(1) Communications with the adversary must and will be maintained
and should grow closer and more intensive as the confrontation sharpens.
(2) One should not seek to win too much, since the other side cannot
afford to lose too much.
(3) One must build "golden bridges55 behind the adversary to facilitate
his retreat. No situation could be more dangerous in the nuclear age than
to box one of the nuclear powers into a corner.
(4) Contingency plans must not be allowed to dictate the manner in
which the crisis is managed.
(5) Local crises shall be met in local terms, even a crisis of the central
balance shall be met at least initially in conventional terms.
(6) The other's side of influence requires a special wariness and restraint

when touched by intramural crises in the way of dissent.

(7) The powers will not allow their signals to each other to become
infected with an excess of misleading ambiguities through consultation

with allies.

(8) Surveillance by contemporary means is legitimate and will not be

interfered with.37

Estabhshing crisis rules is not a new concept. In 1972 the US and Soviet
Union reached an "Incidents at Sea55 agreement, which created a set of
guidelines to be followed in order to avoid a crisis at sea. Such an agree
ment could be the base on which other ground rules could be established
(dealing with air space, for example, which might have prevented an
incident such as the Soviet shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007).
Ground rule agreements might include procedures for dealing with
nuclear detonations of unknown origin; ways to signal peaceful intent
(what Ury and Smoke call "Hands Off Holsters55 signals38); prearranged
agreements establishing face-to-face meetings in times of crises; and con
tingency plans to establish a cease-fire during a crisis. As Ury and Smoke
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note: "The essential value of these agreed-upon crisis procedures lies in
making sure that when the leaders of each side want to avoid or defuse
a crisis, they will not fail for simple lack of machinery to do so."39
E. Institutionalizing a Devil's Advocate Function
While a discussion of all the organizational problems arising in crisis
management is beyond the scope of this paper, a few proposals for im
proving the presidential capacity to deal with organizational difficulties
in a crisis can be advanced.
Information, options, and advice are the most valuable decision-making
components in a crisis. But, as we have already noted, in a crisis, there
are a variety of roadblocks which make it less likely that good information,

options, and advice will reach the president in a usable form. How might
these impediments be circumvented?
In part, the problem of information stems from presidential personality.

If a president does not demand good information?which means occa
sionally accepting critical advice or adverse information?he will not be
likely to get it. But beyond the personality dimension, organizational
problems inhibit the decision-making process. There is a tendency for the
group to agree too readily, defer to the believed wishes of the president,
not cover a sufficient range of alternatives, exclude unpopular viewpoints,

rely on a narrow information source, leave assumptions unchallenged,

cling to group identity, and fail to examine risks fully. In short, the prob

lems?often referred to as "group think"40?cloud the information-de
cision-making process.
As a possible solution to these problems, Alexander George suggests
that presidents implement a system of "multiple advocacy."41 Such a system

would seek to institutionalize a "devil's advocate" function in the presi
dential advisory system. This could be realized in the form of a lone
individual or small department whose sole job would be to tear apart the
assumptions and views of the consensus, to assume the contrary posi
tion^), and to reexamine the goals, assumptions, and approaches of the
group. The individual or head of such a group must be someone close to,
and trusted by, the president, lest his functions degenerate into an "Oh,
not this again!" type of role. For a devil's advocate to work, the devil's
advocate must be respected and listened to.
In an effort to counteract the tendency toward "group think," Irving
Janis offers several prescriptions:

(1) The leader of a policy-forming group should assign the role of
critical evaluator to each member, encouraging the group to give high
priority to airing objections and doubts.
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(2) The leaders in an organization's hierarchy should be impartial instead
of stating preferences and expectations at the outset.
(3) The organization should routinely follow the administrative practice
of setting up several independent policy-planning and evaluation groups
to work on the same policy question, each carrying out its deliberations
under a different leader.

(4) The policy making group should from time to time divide into two
or more subgroups to meet separately, under different chairmen, and then

come together to hammer out their differences.
(5) Each member of the policy making group should discuss periodically
the group's deliberations with trusted associates in his own unit of the
organization and report back their reactions.

(6) One or more outside experts or qualified colleagues within the
organization should be encouraged to challenge the views of the core

members.

(7) At every meeting devoted to evaluating policy alternatives, at least
one member should be assigned to the role of devil's advocate.
(8) A sizable bloc of time should be spent surveying all warning signals
from the rivals and constructing alternate scenarios from the rivals'
intentions.

(9) After reaching a preliminary consensus, the policy making group
should hold a "second chance" meeting at which every member is expected
to express as vividly as he can all his residual doubts and rethink the entire
issue before making a definitive choice.42
Institutionalizing the multiple advocacy role cannot guarantee that a
thorough review of options, information, assumptions, and risks will take
place. It does, however, increase the likelihood that this may take place.
Regardless of the method one uses to try to offset the pathologies of
the decision-making process, there must be a willingness, especially on the
part of the president, to face up to the criticisms of the devil's advocate.
These steps, to be effective, cannot be reduced to empty ritual.

Conclusion
No system of crisis management can replace good judgment; no system

can substitute for wisdom; and no system?however good?can over

come human frailties. However, a solid crisis management system can
improve the likelihood that good decisions are reached and that the grosser

manifestations of irrationality become less pronounced.
While it is common to deal with decision-making from a "rational actor"
perspective, it is clear that in a crisis, rationality is a far cry from reality.

In a crisis, when leaders need to be their most rational, the dynamics of
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the situation impose the most irrational of demands, and a variety of
individual, psychological, and organizational roadblocks impede any hope
of achieving full rationality. Crisis management does not promise to pro
vide a rational atmosphere or a rational decision. Its goal ? limited but
very important ? is simply to promote greater rationality at a time when
it is most needed.
In general, we are aware of the problems which will most likely arise
in a crisis. On the basis of reviews of past crises, we know what to watch
out for. While each crisis has its own dynamic, there are lessons which
emerge when examining crises in a generic sense. Knowing what problems
are most likely to interfere with sound decision-making means that we
may be able to correct for such problems and that we need not be victim
ized by them. In short, we can do better ? if we think, if we are willing
to learn.
If decision-makers are aware of the traps that they are most likely to fall

into ? and are aware of possible ways out ? perhaps they can do better.
The example of President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis, who, having
just read Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August, was determined not to
repeat the same mistakes which led to the outbreak of World War I, should

serve as an example of our ability to learn from the past. Kennedy acted
as if he knew what to do, what to avoid. Reading The Guns of August
alerted him to a variety of problems which he took great pains to overcome.

The crisis management system herein proposed consists of five com
ponents: 1) precrisis training seminars; 2) crisis control centers; 3) crisis
communication; 4) crisis norms or procedures; and 5) institutionalizing
a devil's advocate function. Together, they make up a system which is
designed to provide the opportunity for more rationality in crisis decision
making. Such a system is designed to try and offset many of the problems

which a decision-maker is likely to face in a crisis (see Figure 1).

No crisis management system should be viewed as a panacea. But be

cause of the danger of a crisis escalating into war, it is imperative that we

develop better ways to deal with such situations. Much can be done to
make crises more manageable. If presidents will continue to face crises
which threaten to lead to war, it is important that we give the president
better tools with which to manage such problems.

NOTES_
* Adapted from a paper prepared for delivery at the 1986 annual meet
ing of the Western Political Science Association, Eugene, Oregon, March

20-22, 1986.
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In conclusion, major social and

political transformation in the
present era is even more urgently
required than a crisis management
pushing government officials to
act. This is almost the reverse of
system. However, regardless of
leadership. It is precisely the func what type of state we have, the
crisis management system which
tion of a bureaucrat to "manage."

Hence, crisis "management" be
comes the approach of one work

ing within a system where one re
sponds to problems when they
affect the life of the system. One
can hardly say that those people in
positions of power and prestige
that respond in this fashion really
have national destinies under their
control. "Precrisis planning" could

Genovese proposes can only be of

positive value. It may not be able
to save cultures in decline or those

with fundamental systemic flaws;
however, it can avert a disaster
which could arise from mispercep
tions, misinformation, "group
think,55 and other symptoms of

unqualified decision-makers.
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